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Abstract. The use of Herbert Clark’s work as a theoretical framework in the 
Computer Supported Collaborative Work domain is often dismissed or judged 
as “cooked” and led to a large body of controversy. This article intends to 
reconsider his contribution and re-examined the criticisms he received. The 
main critics addressed to Clark are that his notion of Common Ground is far too 
mentalist and lacks “situatedness”.  We argue that most of these criticisms stem 
from the verbal conversational aspects of Clark’s theory. We sustain here the 
idea that his broader model of the “joint action” provides a fruitful ground for 
research in CSCW. Through one case study of our research, we indeed show 
how what Clark defines as “Common Ground “could be interpreted in a situated 
context. The discussion also addresses how this model can serve as a design 
framework.  
Keywords: CSCW, theory, Intersubjectivity, Clark, Common Ground, 
Grounding. 
1   Introduction 
From the beginning of the CSCW field, theories have played an important role for the 
examination of collaborative practices as well as the design of efficient multi-user 
applications. Different theories such as Malone and Crowston’s Coordination Theory 
[1], Distributed Cognition [2], Activity Theory [3] [4] or Situated Action [5] have 
been drawn from other disciplines and have been applied to make sense of collective 
activities. What is interesting with this small sample of theories commonly transferred 
to CSCW is its relative heterogeneity in terms of disciplines of origin. While 
Distributed Cognition emanated from the Anthropology tradition, Coordination 
Theory came from the Organizational Sciences. Apart from them, other frameworks 
that operate at a finer-grained level have also been employed. This is obviously the 
case of the work from Herbert Clark in psycholinguistics [6][7][8][9][10][11]. 
Originally a psychologist, Clark’s work about the cognitive and social processes of 
language use has received lots of interest in CSCW. Various researchers 
[12][13][14][15][16][17][18] employed it for its relevance as a framework to 
understand how collaboration can be influenced by information technologies. 
However it is noteworthy that these researchers have mainly focused on the verbal 
interaction of Herbert Clark’s Model and less on its importance to describe 
coordination or joint activities. That said, Clark’s theoretical framework has received 
more and more criticisms in the last decade. CSCW researchers have indeed raised 
doubts concerning its validity both for linguistics reasons and issues intrinsically 
linked to the field. 
The goal of this article is twofold. First of all, we aim at providing answers to some 
of these criticisms. Second, we will argue that Clark’s broader model of “joint 
activity” can provide a fruitful ground for research in CSCW. For this purpose, we 
first give a summary of Herbert Clark’s model, introducing the notion of joint action, 
coordination devices and common ground and how they have been employed in 
CSCW. Thereupon, we describe and debunk the main critiques this theoretical work 
as received by linguists and researchers from our domain. The third part of our paper 
presents empirical evidence to support a more situated reading of Clark’s work. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of this stance, showing both the importance of 
theory and why it matters for groupware design.  
2   Theoretical considerations 
2.1   Clark's theory 
Herbert Clark’s work in psycholinguistics first appealed to CSCW researchers 
because it provided a comprehensive framework and vocabulary to describe concepts 
of interest for designing collaborative applications. This included intersubjectivity 
[9][11][6], coordination [7] or how certain technologies affect these collaboration 
practices [8]. According to him and his colleagues, language, be it verbal or non 
verbal, is used when a group of people has to perform joint activities that require 
coordination with each other. In each joint action, participants face what Schelling 
[19] called coordination problems whenever they have common interests, or goals, 
and each person’s actions depend on the actions of the others. In Clark’s terms, the 
problem for the participants in a joint activity is thus to infer what individual actions 
they can expect from each other so that they can pursue the public goal of their joint 
activity. To solve the aforementioned coordination problems, participants rely on 
what Clark called after Stalnaker [20] the “common ground” (CG henceforth): the 
knowledge, beliefs and suppositions participants share about the activity, and that 
accumulate over the course of actions. He also described how this CG is constituted 
of  “coordination devices”: a rationale for mutual expectations that make partners 
believe that they will converge on the same joint action.  
Of all the coordination devices, the most important are certainly explicit 
agreements, which are occurrences of dialogues in which parties explicitly 
communicate their own intentions. When two persons want to meet at a certain place, 
they often solve that problem by talking to each other and agreeing on the place and 
the time.   
Another important type of coordination device is the convention; which Lewis [21] 
describes as the community’s solution to a recurrent coordination problem. 
Conventions or conventional procedures range from rules and regulations to less 
formal codes of appropriate conduct. They are not habits or practices but rules such as 
stopping at the red traffic light or placing knives on the right. Conventions can also be 
more “local” and less bound to the community; for instance three persons who want 
to meet for lunch every Tuesday (a joint action) can agree on meeting at a certain 
place at 12:15. They then each go there at that time every Tuesday (their participatory 
action). In this case, going to the meeting place is not a habit but a convention that has 
been set by participants of the joint activity. According to Clark, this is because “that 
is what they mutually expect each other to do based on the regularity in their recent 
behavior” [7]. As we see in this example, an explicit agreement can evolve into a 
convention if it is established as the agreed solution to a recurrent problem.  
In addition, people ordinarily solve coordination problems using non-conventional 
coordination devices. Clark identifies two types of devices: precedent and manifest. 
Precedent applies to norms and expectations developed within the on-going 
experience of the join activity. If I remember that my friend Paul was at the local pub 
on Friday afternoon of last week, I may expect him to be there this week. Unlike the 
convention of meeting every Tuesday at 12:15, precedents do not depend on mutual 
agreement about an action, they are only expectations based on the previous 
experiences of participants. Malle [22] also coined the term “causal history 
explanation” to refer to expectations based on knowledge of previous behavior of that 
concept because the factors that predict a possible behavior lay in childhood 
experiences, past behavior or the agent’s traits.   
The second type of non-conventional coordination device is manifest elements 
from the environment. Clark also called this “perceptual salience”: it refers to 
situations in which the environment (or the available information) makes the next 
move apparent within the many moves that could conceivably be chosen. During 
surgery, for example, pointing a certain element of anatomy can make it clear to all 
parties involved what to do next. Coordination by manifest elements or perceptual 
salience is thus produced by the very conduct of the joint activity itself. 
These four coordination devices refer to mental representations (conventions, 
precedent), perceptual elements from the environment setting (manifestness) and 
communication (explicit agreement). The relationship between coordination and the 
common ground is twofold. On one hand, the process of coordination can be 
described as updating this common ground through the addition of new information 
(in the form of coordination devices). On the other hand, coordination devices are 
nothing more than a shared basis meant to enable the coordination of participatory 
action that would eventually contribute to joint actions. 
The construction of mutual expectations about participatory actions is 
consequently both cognitive (i.e. expresses the need to access to mental 
representations) and situated, given the set of coordination devices people can rely on. 
Coordination devices thus produce mutual intelligibility between participants. By 
producing and perceiving those elements, people are actively enabling 
intersubjectivity with each other.  Nevertheless, this exchange does not mean that 
coordination is an explicit and permanent process in which participants constantly 
monitor and interpret the devices that are available or that has been produced. 
Coordination should rather be seen as a mutual alignment process during which 
people takes advantage of the available elements. 
Interestingly, this framework has been employed more as a model of discourse and 
communication than a model of coordination (see for example [12][14][15]). [23] for 
instance used the CG model as a theoretical framework to study remote problem 
solving mediated by synchronous textual interaction and whiteboards. Susan Fussell 
and her colleagues [13] intensively used Clark’s theory in their studies of 
collaborative physical tasks (e.g. bicycle repair task, toy-robot building task or online 
jigsaw puzzle) and manipulated features of technology that a pair of students could 
employ to complete the task (e.g. [16][17]). In the same line of research, [18] referred 
to Clark and colleagues’ work in a study of collaborative remote repair tasks using 
video-mediated communication. Wang and Rubart [24] recently applied Clark’s 
theory on language use to hypermedia language in cooperative work settings and 
derived a conceptual framework aimed at informing the design and comparison of 
cooperative hypermedia systems and their use. 
2.2   Critiques against Clark's theory 
Although the previous section highlighted the success and relevance of Clark’s model 
in the study of collaboration, two research communities criticized it: linguists from 
other schools of thoughts and CSCW researchers. 
Linguists from the “pragmatic school” have issued two majors comments regarding 
the “Common Ground” theory and its various instances [25]. The first criticism 
concerns the representation of CG as most of them assumed that Clark claimed how 
CG was iterated through series of checks an individual should do to ground the 
mutual understanding (A should know that B knows X, B should know that A knows 
she knows X, and ad infinitum). Pragmatists such as Green [26], Schiffer [27] or 
Sperber and Wilson [28] hence criticize how overwhelming this would be from a 
cognitive point of view. Paradoxically, Clark fully agree with that, showing in his 
1996 book how this kind of recursion is not possible and that the CG is rather shared: 
there is no need for these checks but that simply recognizing that a piece of 
knowledge is “shared” between the two conversants is sufficient. By pointing out this 
fundamental problem, Clark contenders had a partial reading of his work and 
dismissed the very notion of Common Ground leaving aside the notion of a shared 
representation. A second criticism of Clark’s theory concerned the notion of 
uselessness of the CG. To researchers from the “inference school” such as Sperber 
and Wilson [28] what is important in communication is not the CG but the “mutual 
manifestness” of facts in the participants’ environment. As these authors stated, 
conversants share the same “cognitive environment”: a set of facts that are relevant to 
a person (i.e. that he or she can perceive and draw inferences upon it). However, these 
criticisms of Clark’s theory have focused on earlier versions [9][11] since in the last 
version of Clark’s theory, the notion of coordination devices exchanged during a joint 
activity is actually not far from the mutual cognitive environment. 
More relevant to the discussion here is the fact that Clark’s approach and theories 
also received a fair amount of disapproval from researchers in the CSCW field. For 
instance, Koschman & Lebaron [29] described how features of the material and social 
environment that people draw upon to make decisions were neglected in Clark’s 
theory. They also complained about the difficulty they had to locate common ground 
in the discourse utterances they studied in their research: to them, it could not be 
treated as an empirical fact, because it could not be observed, either directly or 
indirectly. For Koschmann and LeBaron problems arise when one consider CG as a 
possession of conversants such as a cooperatively constructed mental abstraction (i.e. 
a place to store and record things). The CG becomes “a place without place”. 
Similarly, Arnseth and Ludvigsen [30] stated that according to Clark’s view, 
communication was conceived as a process of coordinating knowledge that 
participants already possess. They rejected Clark because he presumably neglected 
that social interaction was the main “site” where participants’ mental states were 
articulated, as if intersubjectivity was independent of the situation and the activity. 
Their criticism is thus that there would be too much mentalism in Clark’s words. 
What is very surprising is that those two criticisms dismissed Clark’s work on the 
basis that the common ground was not situated, which is wrong and definitely based 
on an overly mentalist interpretation. These authors complain about the mentalism 
(the over-reliance on mental representation of the participants to coordinate among 
each others) as well as the difficulty of observing the CG. But they forget the 
elements that constitute it (i.e. coordination devices) are not all mental 
representations: explicit agreements and manifest elements from the situations are, by 
definition, situated and they are hence observable in the course of action. 
The discussion about the situatedness of Clark’s theory also refers to Suchman’s 
discussion of plans and situated actions [5]. Suchman defined the notion of situated 
action in the context of human-computer interaction: she argued that human actions 
are not planned in a strong sense (as supposed by some cognitive scientists) but that 
they are linked to the current situation. She showed that actions are to a great extent 
linked to the specific situation at hand and are therefore hard to predict by using 
generic rules. To her, various kinds of information are available as “resources for 
action” and she describes how plans are such resources but that they must not be 
treated as control structures. Plans, to her, are local, situated and opportunistic: people 
only create a plan for local problems. This is actually not contradictory with Clark’s 
theory, in his own terms, Suchman’s plan can be considered as a “local convention” 
that is set by participants to solve “coordination problems”. The plan can therefore 
establish a relevance hierarchy in the inference process by creating preferential 
coordination devices to solve the joint task. A plan is actually nothing more than the 
discussion of a local convention to solve a local problem. Finally, the way situated 
action describes human action is not contradictory with the coordination problem-
driven theory of Clark: we underlined how coordination devices, as plans, are event-
driven resources for action. The main difference is, however, that Clark accounts for 
some cognitive resources such as precedent or conventions. 
McCarthy [31] asked the question of whether computer supported cooperation 
should be about the technical accomplishment of communication (as underlined in 
Clark’s Model) or about the dialogical experience of collaborators. He stipulates that 
the limitations emerging from the use of Clark’s model are that it forgets relational 
history (e.g. judgments of credibility, trustworthiness of information) and culture, 
which are preponderant in real situations. Here again “conventions” such as described 
by Clark [7] can be evocated as cultural coordination devices that can serve as 
theoretical model to frame research in technology mediated coordination.  
Even though some criticisms cannot be dismissed, most of the comments that have 
been issued by CSCW and linguists can be countered by two arguments. The first one 
is that some critics only focused on early versions of Clark’s work, not taking into 
account the recent contributions: the coordination devices. This aspect actually 
highlights the importance of cognitive, situated and social aspects of interactions, in 
the construction and the update of the common ground. As a second argument, these 
more recent elements about coordination devices counterbalance the very mentalist 
interpretations of Clark that dismissed his theory. To sum up, most of the criticisms 
addressed to Clark are on his consideration about the verbal interaction level. We 
sustain here the idea that the generalized model of “joint activity” during 
conversations proposed by Clark [7] can by effectively applied to the general problem 
of group coordination in CSCW. We agree with Klein and his colleagues [32] that 
“Joint activity” relies on coordination features such as interpredictability of the 
participants’ attitudes and actions that are based on common ground. Furthermore, 
joint activity also relies on what the authors call “basic compact” – an often-tacit 
agreement to facilitate coordination and prevent its breakdown through commitment 
to align participants multiple goals (i.e. maintaining the common ground). Hence the 
Common Ground is the most important basis of inter-predictability. It is noteworthy 
that the CG in our view is not a state or a “space” [29] of “having the same 
knowledge, data and goals” [32]. One can rather refer to the CG as a process of 
building and maintaining a mutual understanding [7]. 
3   Empirical grounds  
Now that we have described Clark’s model, how it’s criticized and what arguments 
we can oppose, let us complement our argumentation with our own research. 
Qualitative results from one of our studies offer an empirical basis to what we 
described above. 
3.1   Field study procedure 
A recent study we conducted addressed the socio-cognitive influence of location-
awareness interfaces (see [33]) showing how knowing others’ whereabouts has 
intricate relationship with group coordination. In this field experiment, we designed a 
pervasive game called Catchob! played by groups of 3 players who had to collaborate 
to find a virtual object (‘Bob’) located somewhere on our campus. Team-mates used 
TabletPCs on which they could access a map of the environment and different 
features represented on Figure 1. The interface features an individual proximity 
sensor, which indicates whether the user is close or far from the object through the 
number of red bars displayed at the top of the interface. The tool also enables 
synchronous communication through shared map annotations with the stylus (with a 
different color for each player). Annotations slowly fade out until they become 
completely invisible (after 4 minutes). 
 Fig. 1. Game interface as seen by one player. Location-awareness is the fact that 2 players 
avatars are displayed.  
 Moreover, an important feature of that interface was a location-awareness tool that 
enabled them to automatically get each of their own spatial location in real-time by 
clicking on a refresh button. Our precedent COOP paper in 2006 tackled the 
differences between the presence of this location-awareness tool and its absence, 
showing how self-disclosure can be more powerful because it allowed to convey 
intentionality. In order to deepen our understanding of the role of location-awareness 
in collaboration practices, we continued our investigation by how players coordinated 
and what information they relied on to figure out what their partners were doing. 
10 groups of 3 students of our school participated in this field study. After being 
presented the game instructions at the lab, players were given 3 minutes to plan their 
strategy on a map (grounded plan), which was then left in the office. Players were 
then led to the common starting point at the centre of the campus. After completing 
the game (or reaching the 30 minutes limit), players were interviewed together using a 
replay of their activity (see more about this in [33]). The replay tool displayed in real 
time the position of each group member as well as their annotations. Those traces of 
the activity were presented to push players to explain what happened, an interview 
technique known as self-confrontation [34].  The player or the experimenter selected 
episodes of the game replay and asked one player to tell what happened then. In 
general, the player’s answers triggered other comments by partners, turning the 
interview into a discussion about each of these moments. Conversations were 
recorded and for each episode, the experimenter also asked one player whether he/she 
knew what one of his/her partner was doing (and then thus partner was asked if the 
provided answer was right). This interview allowed us to collect evidence of the 
inferences performed by the participants.  
3.2   Results 
Post-game interviews, conducted along with a replay tool of the players’ activity 
allowed to collect verbal comments about the activity matched with shared map 
annotations. This leads to the description of a typology of “coordination devices”: the 
mutually recognized information that enables teammates to choose the right actions 
for collaboration. We observed five categories of coordination devices (the 
description below included excerpts from the post-game interview, all translated from 
French): 
1) The plan that players set before starting the game was the most often cited 
coordination device. During these few minutes players discussed both the strategy 
they wanted to apply and the communication conventions they would use: “We 
decided that we would begin to send messages only when having some signal on the 
proximity sensor”; “We planned that the first who had some signal would send it to 
the other with the figure written on the map, before anybody should communicate 
anything”. 
2) Communication acts were the second most prominent coordination device 
cited by players. Even though communication was achieved through a narrow 
medium (map annotations on the TabletPC), important discussions about strategies 
discussion have been undertaken. The excerpts below provides examples of dialogues 
(as players recalled them): “I knew they were joining me because I drew a circle on 
the map where I thought Bob was, and they said ok we’re coming”; “At that moment, 
I asked her what she was doing and she told me that she was backtracking”. Dialogue 
occurrences like these were important for trajectory awareness and division of labor. 
However, most of the communication acts were not proper dialogues but 
announcements of proximity signal information (“I was telling them my readings, on 
a regular basis”:), self-declared positions (“As soon as I got a reading I would put it 
and I would tell him where I was”) or trajectories (“He drew an arrow, he marked the 
reading he was giving and the general direction where he was heading”). 
3) The location-awareness tool has been cited as an important coordinative 
device by players: “I saw that he was going in that direction, then I joined him”, “I 
saw Sandra  heading to the CE building so I thought we had to join her”, “I knew they 
were arriving though the IN building because I saw their last positions”.  
4) Knowledge about the partners was also a powerful coordination device for 
some groups as explained by these two players: “I saw that Sandra was not moving, 
but I know her, she always moves and she’s not lazy, so she was moving”, “I saw he 
was coming from downstairs but I know him, I thought he would take the lift instead 
of the stairs”. By knowing a partner’s habit and behavior, players could infer some 
meaning about the course of action. 
5) Knowledge about the environment was a key to coordination. Here are 
examples of how two players expressed this: “There is a bottleneck here between the 
CE and CM buildings, I knew he could only arrive from there”, “I did not know he 
were joining me or go elsewhere but I knew there were a chance that I would meet 
him at La Coupole [center of the campus]”.  
This list of coordination devices actually fits with Clark’s model of coordination 
that we presented in Section 2.1 as they correspond to his typology of devices. In 
Clark’s terms, knowledge about partners and the environment would be “Precedent” 
(when a precedent experience allows participants to form some expectations about 
others’ behavior). Dialogue acts would be “Explicit Agreement” (when the 
participants explicitly acknowledge the information exchanged).  The grounded plan 
discussed at the beginning is a set of “Conventions” (when conventional procedures 
are set by the participants). And finally, manifest elements from the environment; 
topology, network coverage, location-awareness information and non-acknowledged 
communication would be “Manifest elements”. 
4   Discussion and conclusions 
In the present contribution, we argued that Herbert Clark’s model of the joint activity 
in conversations can be broadened to the general notion of group coordination. For 
Clark [7], people enter in joint activities when they have to solve coordination 
problems (e.g. coordination in a collaborative treasure hunt). Coordination depends on 
the ability to predict more or less accurately the actions of others. This predictability 
relies on, the commitment made by each party to make its actions predictable (e.g. 
providing the partners with one’s position), and the situation (e.g. the state of the 
problem; the time left; each partners positions etc.). Our empirical results have shown 
how coordination devices could allow this predictability. These features constitute 
what is called the common ground: the accumulation of “coordination devices” that 
can be considered as signaling mechanisms stemming from various sources such as 
verbal interaction among peers, the situation at hand, participants culture, etc. Clark 
proposed general categories of coordination devices (explicit agreements, 
conventions, precedents and perceptual salience) that can of course be deepened and 
more thoroughly described depending on the context at hand. 
This paper did not aim at answering every critics addressed to Herbert Clark’s 
theory. The present contribution was rather geared towards providing answers to the 
two main issues raised in the literature: the so-called mentalistic aspects of Clark’s 
theory and its lack of situatedness. The aforementioned empirical evidences show 
how common ground could be interpreted in a situated context. It is also interesting to 
note how the process themselves, such Clark’s grounding, are often more accepted by 
the research community than the substrate they manipulate (the common ground, the 
presence of mutual models). This situation is a bit paradoxical given that the existence 
of such process implies the notion of mental representation. 
Furthermore, we believe the mentalistic view of the Clark model to be a side effect 
of the “crusade” against the cognitivist information processing model” (what was 
called by Cooper and Bowers [35], the “first wave HCI”), by authors of the “second 
wave HCI” pioneered by Winograd and Flores [36] and Suchman [5]. As sustained by 
Kaptelinin and Nardi [3], these approaches are mainly built upon “an unusually 
rebellious and antitheoretical branch of sociology known as ethnomethodology” [3]. 
Even though this second wave of HCI tradition broadly contributed to research and 
methodologies in CSCW, the antitheoretical stance may somehow weaken result 
generalizability. We agree with Kaptelinin and Nardi who emphasize on the 
importance of theoretical models for the purpose of comparability, abstraction and 
generalization. To paraphrase the authors, we need theoretical models in order to 
move “forward, to know where to invest our energies […]. Otherwise we will always 
be going back to the square one of detailed renderings of particular cases” [3]. Clark’s 
general model of the “joint activity” is such a theoretical model that can help framing 
research in fields studying collaboration processes such as CSCW or CSCL. 
Consequently, we sustain the idea that it is possible to have a more social and 
situated interpretation of Clark, which makes it still relevant to be employed as a 
framework in CSCW, fruitful not only for researchers but also for designers. On one 
hand, Clark’s “joint activity” model can serve as a theoretical framework (not to say 
“common ground”) for the process of hypothesis generation, abstraction 
generalization and result communication. On the other hand, Clark’s model can help 
the design of applications and services aiming at enhancing collaboration that involve 
the creation or the support of new coordination devices. Therefore, the early stage of 
the design of a groupware application requires to have a clear overview of how group 
members work but also employ coordination devices. Clark’s notions and typology is 
a representational framework to describe and predict team-mates behavior and thus 
propose appropriate solutions to support electronically the exchange of certain 
coordination devices. 
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